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CASSIUS DIO’S AGRIPPA-MAECENAS DEBATE:  
AN OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS
Eric AdlEr
u
Abstract. This article discusses Cassius Dio’s political thought in his Agrippa-
Maecenas debate (52.2–40) through the use of a form of content analysis developed 
by political scientists called “operational code analysis.” It offers a description of 
operational code analysis, which demonstrates the value of this method to the 
debate. It then presents an examination of Dio’s operational code, from which 
one can glean his philosophical and instrumental views on politics. It argues, inter 
alia, that the Agrippa address is based on the same epistemological foundations 
as the Maecenean corollary. Further, the article stresses that the Agrippa ora-
tion remains consistent with views Dio expresses elsewhere in his history. This 
suggests that scholars should not discount the efficacy of the Agrippa oration, 
despite its utopian character.
I. EXPANDING OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE DEBATE
clAssicAl scholArs hAvE long viEwEd cAssius dio’s famous 
Agrippa-Maecenas debate (52.2–40)1 as the most interesting portion of his 
Historia Romana.2 As a result, this lengthy dialogue, set in 29 b.c.E., has 
received more scholarly attention than any other aspect of Dio’s work.3
The debate features Octavian’s advisors counseling disparate courses 
of action, now that the man who would become Rome’s first emperor 
1The book numbers and text of Dio used for this article are from Boissevain 
1895–1931. For citations from Books 61–80, the standard numeration appears in parentheses 
beside Boissevain’s revised numbers. All translations are my own.
2According to Schwartz 1899, 1719, for example, the Maecenas oration in the debate 
amounts to the only speech in Dio’s history worthy of much attention.
3 Discussions of this debate are legion. See, e.g., Meyer 1891; Jardé 1925, 26–32; Ham-
mond 1932; Gabba 1955, 311–25, and 1962; Bleicken 1962; Millar 1964, 102–18; Berrigan 
1968; van Stekelenburg 1971, 110–16; Manuwald 1979, 21–25; McKechnie 1981; Espinosa 
Ruiz 1982; Zawadzki 1983; Fechner 1986, 71–86; Reinhold 1988, 165–210; Steidle 1988, 
203–11; Fishwick 1990; Smyshlyayev 1991; Kuhlmann 2010. Scholars have typically shown 
greater interest in the Maecenas speech (especially in regard to its specific proposals for 
political reform) than its Agrippan corollary.
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4 For this contention, which Meyer links to Dio’s supposed criticism of Alexander 
Severus, see Meyer 1891, 80–93. For criticism of this view, see Gabba 1955, 314–15; Millar 
1964, 102–4; Reinhold 1988, 182. According to Bleicken 1962, 467, Alexander Severus’ rule 
was not a return to a pro-senatorial policy.
5 Reinhold 1988, 165. According to Starr 1952, 12, the debate “shed more light on 
the nature of the Empire than any other single source.”
6 Scholars have proposed disparate dates of composition for the debate, all of which 
seem possible, to a greater or lesser extent. E.g., Bleicken 1962, 446, Bowersock 1972, 202–3, 
and Smyshlyayev 1991, 142 (222–235 c.E.); Millar 1964, 104 (the end of 214 c.E.); Barnes 
1984, 250 (222–223 c.E.); Espinosa Ruiz 1982, 488 (222 c.E. as the terminus ante quem); 
Zawadzki 1983, 278 (214–229 c.E.); Reinhold 1988, 181 (who suggests any time from 211 
to 222 c.E.). Fishwick 1990, 274–75, reasonably concludes that we cannot be certain when 
Dio wrote the debate. According to Smyshlyayev 1991, 140, the dating of the debate “in a 
way determines its interpretation.”
had taken control of the state. Dio’s Agrippa offers a brief in favor of 
democracy (2–13); to him, Octavian ought to restore the Roman Republic. 
The historian’s Maecenas favors monarchy and lays out a remarkably 
specific political program for the aspiring ruler. The debate thus allows 
Dio both to present theoretical ruminations on politics and to suggest 
pragmatic reforms for the Roman state. It serves as a unique opportunity 
to determine the political inclinations of an influential senator from the 
high Empire.
Despite its age, in many ways Meyer’s 1891 dissertation, De Mae-
cenatis oratione a Dione ficta, continues to set the intellectual parameters 
for the modern study of this debate. This remains the case despite the fact 
that many classicists have disagreed with aspects of Meyer’s analysis; his 
perception that the Maecenas address demonstrates Dio’s anti-senatorial 
stance appears particularly unpopular.4 Yet Meyer asked the sorts of 
questions about the debate that have continued to occupy scholars for 
over a century. In part as a result of his work’s influence, classicists have 
focused much of their attention, for instance, on the date of the debate’s 
composition, the pedigree of the ideas it advances, and Dio’s rationale 
for including it in his history.
These naturally remain significant concerns. But, given the overall 
importance of the Agrippa-Maecenas debate (according to Reinhold it is 
“the only theoretical analysis of Roman government and society from the 
third century”),5 it may prove valuable to examine other substantive issues 
that pertain to it. This seems particularly likely because many conclusions 
Meyer and other scholars have stressed hinge on the year in which Dio 
wrote the debate, and ultimately we possess insufficient evidence to fix 
its date of composition with real authority.6 Under the circumstances, it 
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7 Zawadzki 1983, 318.
8 Contra Walker 1990, 403, and Crichlow 1998, 688, there is no direct link between the 
work of Merton 1954 and OCA. Accordingly, Walker 2003 and Walker and Schafer 2010, 
in offering histories of this analysis, do not cite Merton as its progenitor. George 1969, 191, 
dislikes the term “operational code,” but this remains the label attached to the method.
9 Political scientists and political psychologists who have engaged in OCA gener-
ally remain cagey about its use to predict the future actions of statesmen and leadership 
groups. See, e.g., George 1969, 191; Walker 1990, 406, 412: “An individual’s operational code 
may structure the ‘menu for choice,’ thereby defining the range of the decision-maker’s 
choice propensities, but operational code theory is relatively silent about the cognitive and 
emotional processes that accompany the specific definitions of the situation, decision, and 
action.” Yet many scholars have clearly aimed to employ OCA to determine the likely 
parameters of leaders’ future conduct. For an up-to-date history of OCA and its use, see 
Walker and Schafer 2010.
10 Leites 1951, xi.
may be useful to investigate the Agrippa-Maecenas debate by means of 
a fresh approach.
According to Zawadzki, it is unfortunate that no one has examined 
the Agrippa-Maecenas debate from the perspective of political science.7
This article undertakes such an investigation. More specifically, it probes 
Dio’s political thought through the use of “operational code analysis” 
(OCA), a type of content analysis developed by political scientists to 
unearth and compare the worldviews of various modern leaders in a sys-
tematic way. The article commences with a brief history and description of 
OCA, which demonstrates the applicability and value of this method to 
the Agrippa-Maecenas debate. The article then presents an examination 
of Dio’s operational code, from which we can glean broader aspects of 
Dio’s political views. This analysis aims to expand our understanding of 
the Agrippa-Maecenas debate and Dio’s political thought, with a view to 
complementing the rich literature on both the dialogue and Dio himself.
II. A HISTORY OF OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS
In two landmark works of political science investigating Bolshevik ide-
ology, Nathan Leites (1951, 1953), a scholar at the RAND Corporation 
and the University of Chicago, coined the term “operational code” to 
signify the underlying worldviews of his subjects.8 Leites examined various 
Marxist and Bolshevik writings to present a detailed characterization of 
the Bolsheviks’ belief system, in hopes that such analysis would provide 
standards and guidelines for their future behavior.9 In his own words, 
Leites attempted “to discover the rules which the Bolsheviks believe 
to be necessary for effective political conduct.”10 The U.S. government 
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11 Bell 1955, 179.
12 George 1969.
13 George borrowed the distinction between “philosophical” (i.e., “epistemological”) 
and “instrumental” beliefs from Brim et al. 1962.
14Walker 1990, 405.
judged Leites’ work sufficiently valuable to serve as a guide for American 
negotiators in truce talks with the Communists in Korea.11
It was not until political scientist Alexander George systematized 
Leites’ methods in a seminal 1969 article, however, that further academic 
work on operational code commenced.12 George transformed Leites’ 
approach to content analysis into the study of modern leaders’ philosophi-
cal and instrumental beliefs about politics.13 Stephen Walker, a prominent 
practitioner of OCA, characterized the distinction between these two 
sorts of beliefs thus: “Whereas philosophical (i.e., epistemological) beliefs 
refer to the assumptions and premises about the fundamental nature of 
politics, the nature of political conflict, and the role of the individual in 
history, instrumental beliefs focus upon ends-means relationships in the 
context of political action.”14 
George suggested that researchers could unearth these beliefs, and 
ultimately compare the worldviews of disparate leaders, by using a set 
of standardized questions to structure the analysis of leaders’ speeches 
and writings:
Philosophical Questions
(P 1)  What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political 
universe one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental 
character of one’s political opponents?
(P 2)  What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fun-
damental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic 
or must one be pessimistic on this score, and in what respects the 
one and/or the other?
(P 3)  Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
(P 4)  How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical 
development? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” his-
tory in the desired direction?
(P 5)  What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical 
development?
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15 George 1969, 201–16.
16 E.g., Holsti 1970; McLellan 1971; Walker 1977; Hermann 1980.
17 See Holsti 1977; George 1979.
18 For a fuller discussion of VICS, see Crichlow 1998, 683–90; Walker and Schafer 
2010, 5499–503.
19 E.g., Crichlow 1998; Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998; Walker and Schafer 2000; 
Verbeek 2003; Feng 2005.
Instrumental Questions
(I 1)  What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for 
political action?
(I 2)  How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
(I 3)  How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and 
accepted?
(I 4)  What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interests?
(I 5)  What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s 
interests?15
These questions served as the wellspring for numerous forays into 
qualitative OCA.16 In subsequent methodological studies, George and 
Ole Holsti (another formative theorist of operational code) refined and 
augmented these sets of questions, in part to ensure that OCA remained 
compatible with new findings about belief systems from the realm of 
cognitive psychology.17
More recently, political scientists have attempted quantitative 
approaches to determining modern leaders’ operational codes. The most 
popular of these has proved to be the Verbs in Context System (VICS), 
which was pioneered at the start of the twenty-first century.18 Through 
a statistical analysis of language used in speeches and writings, VICS 
provides quantitative evidence to support conclusions about a leader’s 
operational code. It measures philosophical and instrumental beliefs 
along indices corresponding to George’s questions, focusing especially on 
the choice and frequency of particular verbs that leaders use to describe 
potential courses of action. Thus, the extent to which leaders believe that 
they can influence historical development through their own actions, for 
example, can be quantified and compared. Political scientists and psycholo-
gists have continued to publish scholarship on OCA to the present day.19
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20 See Walker 1990, 410. For a discussion of some weaknesses inherent to qualitative 
approaches to OCA, see Holsti 1977, 42–43.
21 E.g., Meyer 1891, 73–87, whose useful discussion in many ways amounts to the locus
classicus of this argument; Schwartz 1899, 1719–20; Jardé 1925, 26–32, esp. 32; Hammond 
1932, 89–90; Ensslin 1939, 59–60; Starr 1952, 13; Crook 1955, 126–28; Bleicken 1962, esp. 453; 
Gabba 1962, who attributes Maecenas’ recommendations for the Empire’s fiscal policy to 
Dio; Millar 1964, 107, who sees the second (instrumental) portion of the Maecenas address 
as “a political pamphlet”; Berrigan 1968, esp. 43; van Stekelenburg 1971, esp. 111; Forte 1972, 
485–86; Manuwald 1979, 21; McKechnie 1981, esp. 150; Zawadzki 1983, 276, 296; Barnes 
1984, 254; Aalders 1986, 282, n. 6; Reinhold 1988, 179, who believes that the Maecenas ora-
tion “is the authentic voice of Dio: it contains the essence of his pragmatic thinking about 
the Empire, the monarchy to which he was unreservedly committed, and the interests and 
role of his social class in the imperial governance”; Gowing 1992, 25–26; Swan 2004, 28; 
Kuhlmann 2010, esp. 117–18. Smyshlyayev 1991 largely agrees, though he stresses that not 
all the suggestions in the Maecenas speech necessarily correspond to Dio’s personal senti-
ments (143). Fechner 1986, 72–73, however, is not certain that Maecenas’ sentiments are 
Dio’s. Hammond 1932 suggested that the Maecenas speech offers a portrait of the Empire 
and its evolution as it existed in Dio’s day. Scholars have not found this convincing: see, 
e.g., Gabba 1955, 318; Bleicken 1962, 447–49; Barnes 1984, 254, n. 58.
III. THE APPLICABILITY OF OPERATIONAL CODE  
ANALYSIS TO THE AGRIPPA-MAECENAS DEBATE
There are numerous reasons to believe that OCA amounts to a fruit-
ful direction for those investigating the Agrippa-Maecenas debate. This 
remains the case, despite the fact that classical scholars must confine 
themselves to qualitative analysis of the subject; our comparatively mea-
ger evidence—combined with the differences between ancient Greek 
and English—does not allow for quantitative approaches such as VICS. 
Quantitative studies, however, have validated the efficacy of qualitative 
assessments of operational codes, and thus we need not fear that we are 
employing an “outdated” methodology.20
Since political scientists investigating modern leaders’ operational 
codes have focused much of their attention on speeches, the method’s 
applicability to the Agrippa-Maecenas debate should be obvious. As is not 
the case with the modern addresses political scientists study, Dio attrib-
uted the sentiments in the dialogue to two historical personages, rather 
than take credit for them himself. Thus there may be some doubt as to 
whether our analysis will discover Dio’s personal operational code. Yet 
classicists investigating the Agrippa-Maecenas debate have long believed 
that the Maecenas oration at least largely presents Dio’s views.21 Some 
recent scholarship, moreover, has suggested that Agrippa’s speech also 
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22 E.g., Espinosa Ruiz 1982, esp. 35–36, 90–101, 470–73; Pelling 1983, 222; Zawadzki 
1983, 316.
23This seems an especially important point in light of the incisive work of Kuhlmann 
2010, which suggests the strong influence of the constitutional debate of Herodotus (3.80–82) 
on the Agrippa-Maecenas dialogue. Although many of Kuhlmann’s points are well taken, 
he may overstate the Herodotean pedigree of Dio’s debate. On this topic, see below. Kuhl-
mann, esp. 114–16, for instance, contends that Agrippa anachronistically argues in favor of 
Greek-style democracy because Herodotus has Otanes do the same (3.80). It is important 
to recognize that even Kuhlmann, who focuses much attention on the Herodotean pedigree 
of the debate, contends that it broadcasts many of Dio’s own sentiments. 
24 E.g., Schwartz 1899, 1719–20; Ensslin 1939, 59, who believed that Agrippa’s address 
would only appeal to “incurable romanticists”; Gabba 1955, 316; van Stekelenburg 1971, 
110–11; Swan 2004, 28. Zawadzki 1983, 283, does not completely discount the importance 
of the Agrippa speech but still views it as a mere rhetorical declamation that fails to rise 
to the level of a political program. According to Berrigan 1968 and Fechner 1986, however, 
Agrippa’s address is more philosophically compelling than Maecenas’ corollary, but this 
conclusion has not proved popular. Cf. Reinhold 1988, 170: “Because of its general, largely 
theoretical nature, Agrippa’s speech is usually dismissed as conventional rhetoric, following 
a pattern of the traditional suasoria of the schools, filled with rhetorical topoi.”
25 E.g., Espinosa Ruiz 1982, esp. 33–36, 90–101; Pelling 1983, 222; Zawadzki 1983, 316; 
Fechner 1986, 73–74, 78–83; Reinhold 1988, 170. Cf. Steidle 1988, 207. Although he still links 
Dio’s personal views to the Maecenas speech, Manuwald 1979, 23, notes that the Historia
Romana contains some sentiments sympathetic to those appearing in the Agrippa oration.
contains sentiments ascribable to the historian.22 Accordingly, despite 
Dio’s attribution of the remarks in the debate, we have strong reason 
to believe that this invented dialogue can tell us much about Dio’s own 
political proclivities. The forthcoming analysis, moreover, will present 
sufficiently strong overlap between attitudes detectable in the debate 
and opinions Dio expresses elsewhere in the history to suggest that the 
dialogue contains many of the historian’s own opinions—even though 
undoubtedly not every argument Agrippa and Maecenas pronounce in 
it corresponds to Dio’s normative political views.23 
In fact, OCA can help us solve, inter alia, one important aspect of the 
debate of interest to modern scholars. According to most, Dio’s Agrippa 
address presents an intentionally weak case in favor of democracy, which 
serves as a counterpoise for Dio’s “true” views in the Maecenas oration.24
Others, however, contend that Dio intended readers to reflect on the 
dialogue as a whole, and that his beliefs are apparent in both orations, 
regardless of the debate’s superficially agonistic character.25 By separately 
assessing the operational codes of Dio’s Agrippa and Maecenas, we can 
help settle this matter.
Features specific to the dialogue also make it an apt subject for 
OCA. Agrippa’s oration presents a philosophical defense of democracy; 
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26 It is unfortunate that the Agrippa oration lacks an instrumental section, for this 
would have allowed us to present a comparative analysis of both speeches’ answers for all 
George’s questions. As we shall see, however, we possess a good deal of evidence regarding 
Dio’s instrumental beliefs. Moreover, our examination will encompass more than a compari-
son between the two orations. It will also analyze Dio’s operational code more broadly, by 
discussing various relevant portions of the Historia Romana, and will allow for comparisons 
and contrasts between Dio and other ancient authors. An instrumental portion of Dio’s 
Agrippa address would have been useful, but it is by no means essential for our purposes. 
27 Swan 2004, 8–13.
it seems an ideal text for the philosophical portion of George’s queries. 
The longer Maecenas speech offers both a theoretical justification for 
monarchy (14–18) and a detailed series of concrete proposals for the 
administration of the Empire (19–40). This address can be usefully divided 
according to the philosophical and instrumental categories George estab-
lished for operational code.26
Nor is this sort of analysis merely applicable to the Agrippa-
Maecenas dialogue; it will also serve to expand our understanding of it. 
In some cases, political scientists have focused on queries similar to those 
Dio scholars have explored. Swan, for instance, offers helpful analysis of 
Dio’s views on chance, and this roughly corresponds to George’s question 
P 5.27 In other cases, political scientists and political psychologists engaged 
in content analysis have proved interested in different sorts of queries 
from those typically examined by scholarship on the debate. OCA thus 
brings to light some new questions that will broaden our knowledge of 
Dio’s political outlook. 
The method possesses other advantages. Unlike traditional dis-
cursive approaches to classical texts, OCA facilitates an investigation 
that proceeds systematically. It will force us to determine whether Dio’s 
Agrippa and Maecenas present similar or different answers to funda-
mental political questions. The systematic nature of OCA will also allow 
classicists to engage in potentially rich comparative investigations of their 
subjects’ worldviews. By offering a shared conceptual framework and a 
useful set of typologies, it can help ancient historiographers place their 
conclusions in a broader comparative perspective. OCA may therefore 
prove useful not only for those investigating the work of Dio; compara-
tive estimations of various classical authors’ operational codes could also 
yield further insights.
Before I begin this study, we should recognize a few potential 
complications involved in applying George’s version of OCA to the 
Agrippa-Maecenas debate. First, it is important to recognize that George’s 
elaboration of operational code pertains chiefly to the realm of foreign 
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28 Nor, we should add, is George alone in limiting OCA chiefly to discussions of 
foreign affairs. See, e.g., Holsti 1977, whose elaborations on George’s original questions 
are so focused on foreign policy as to seem largely inapplicable to the Agrippa-Maecenas 
dialogue. One notes, moreover, a tendency on the part of political scientists engaging in 
OCA to home in on international affairs in their studies: e.g., Walker 1977; Crichlow 1998.
29 Few sentiments offered in the dialogue center on foreign policy. Dio’s Maecenas 
stresses that a ruler should be inclined toward peace, though his army should always be 
prepared for war (52.37.1). He expends little effort, however, elaborating on the rationale 
behind a non-expansionist foreign policy.
30 Leites 1951, xiii: “there is reason to assume that these rules [i.e., the Bolshevik 
operational code] are pervasive in Bolshevik policy calculations, whether they refer to 
domestic or foreign policy, propaganda, or military policy.”
31 On Dio’s life and career, see Millar 1964, 5–27; Zawadzki 1983, 277–78; Swan 
2004, 1–3.
32 See Crichlow 1998, 690, who attempts to minimize the complications that this entails.
33 For good reason, no modern scholar has contended that the debate amounts to 
a recording of sentiments that the historical Agrippa and Maecenas uttered. Some have 
suggested, furthermore, that Dio’s choice of Agrippa as the supporter of democracy is inapt: 
policy.28 Dio’s dialogue, however, mostly concerns domestic issues.29 As 
we shall see anon, this necessitates minor changes to a few of George’s 
original questions. We need not trouble ourselves overmuch with this mat-
ter, however, since Leites himself never confined OCA to foreign affairs,30
and the later focus on the international realm undoubtedly relates to the 
history of this method’s use during the Cold War.
Additionally, political scientists engaged in OCA have attempted to 
determine the belief systems of either political leaders or (less often) elite 
groups in power. Dio himself, though a member of the Roman Senate and 
a two-time consul, was never in a position of serious Imperial authority 
and power.31 All the same, since Dio’s Agrippa-Maecenas dialogue focuses 
on the correct course of action for a leader who possesses this sort of 
power, it should still allow us the opportunity to discern the historian’s 
sentiments regarding grand strategic concerns amenable to OCA.
We should recognize, furthermore, that various issues that cause 
problems for political scientists employing these methods do not trouble 
us. Numerous political scientists have examined modern leaders’ opera-
tional codes through an analysis of their public speeches. In the case of 
most of these leaders, their addresses were composed by speechwriters, 
rather than by the political actor. This renders such studies more prob-
lematic, especially if they encompass quantitative analysis of individual 
word choices.32 In studying the Agrippa-Maecenas debate, however, we 
can be virtually certain that it was the product of Dio himself—even if not 
all its sentiments amount to Dio’s normative political views.33  Regarding 
486 ERIC ADLER
e.g., Gabba 1955, 317; Millar 1964, 105; Reinhold 1988, 167. Cf. van Stekelenburg 1971, 108; 
McKechnie 1981, 154; Zawadzki 1983, 281; Fechner 1986, 74. If it is true that Dio’s Maecenas 
address in part aims to limit the power and influence of the equestrians in the Empire (as 
Espinosa Ruiz 1982, esp. 478, argues), one could argue that the equestrian Maecenas seems 
like a similarly unlikely conduit for such sentiments.
34 Leites 1951, the book that inaugurated OCA, itself relies on translations of Lenin’s 
and Stalin’s speeches and writings.
35 See above, n. 9. We also do not need to worry about cognitive consistency theory 
and other concerns from the realm of cognitive, social, and motivational psychology, which 
matter to those aiming to determine the ways in which leaders’ political views may alter 
over time. On the importance of this issue, see George 1979; Walker 2003, 55–58; Walker 
and Schafer 2010, 5493, 5497–98.
36 See, e.g., Fechner 1986, 76, who argues that the Agrippa address is almost entirely 
preserved. Cf. Reinhold 1988, 168: “A one-folio lacuna in the manuscript curtails the end of 
Agrippa’s speech (2–13) and the start of Maecenas’ (14–40).” On the manuscript tradition 
of Dio’s Book 52, see Zawadzki 1983, 273–74.
the addresses of non-English-speaking actors, moreover, political scien-
tists employing OCA tend to rely on translations;34 we need not do so. 
Nor must we worry about another concern that impacts the study of 
contemporary political leaders: in examining Dio, we obviously have no 
concern for using the method as a means to divine his future conduct.35
At the very least, OCA of the Agrippa-Maecenas debate will broaden 
our approach to this dialogue and suggest responses about core political 
beliefs that Dio harbored.
IV. THE OPERATIONAL CODES OF  
DIO’S AGRIPPA AND MAECENAS
In the following sections, you will find George’s list of philosophical and 
instrumental questions for OCA, which are individually accompanied 
by responses. With regard to each of the philosophical queries, three 
separate analyses appear—one for Dio’s Agrippa speech, another for 
Maecenas’ reply, and a third for the remainder of Dio’s history. These 
distinct responses will also permit comparative analysis. Through these 
means, we aim to clarify the epistemological foundations of Dio’s opera-
tional code. For the instrumental questions, analyses follow only for the 
Maecenas oration and Dio’s history as a whole, since the Agrippa speech, 
lacking a pragmatic program of reform, does not address this portion of 
George’s queries. Although neither oration has survived from antiquity in 
its entirety, we appear to possess the large majority of them;36 undoubt-
edly, sufficient portions of the orations remain for them to serve as the 
material for an examination of Dio’s operational code.
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37This calls to mind the tension between Dio’s Thucydidean take on human nature 
and the historian’s attempt to offer moral instruction to his readership. On this topic, see 
Reinhold 1988, 215; Rich 1989, 91; Adler 2011a, 146–47. If anything, Dio appears even 
more pessimistic about human nature than was Thucydides, as the scholarly debate over 
Thucydides’ views on this matter demonstrates. For recent criticisms of the conclusion that 
Thucydides remains utterly cynical on this score, see, for example, Johnson Bagby 1994, 
esp. 143–47; Ober 1998, 67–72; Kokaz 2001, esp. 38; Lebow 2003, 145–46. See also Crane 
1998, 296–303.
V. THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS
(P 1) What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political 
universe one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character 
of one’s political opponents?
The Agrippa Speech. The implicit responses of Dio’s Agrippa to these 
questions revolve around domestic political opponents; the speech does 
not mention foreign affairs. Its “enemies,” then, are all disgruntled citizens 
and other internal threats to the political order. We can still categorize 
the oration’s commentary on the nature of political life as pessimistic. 
Agrippa casts the political universe as so hostile and a man’s enemies so 
numerous that democracy becomes the only possible way to endure the 
evils of human nature. In the course of the speech, Dio depicts Roman 
citizens as incorrigibly suspicious of those in power; thus his Agrippa 
argues that if Octavian decides to establish a monarchy, his subjects will 
believe that he aimed to enslave them (2.4). Furthermore, the oration 
stresses that monarchs inevitably spawn conspirators and other enemies 
(4.4, 5.4). For the man in control of the state, it remains impossible to 
guard against opponents justly, since they are inevitably so numerous (8.1).
The speech also attempts to support the conclusion that democ-
racies are far more harmonious than tyrannies. This leaves the reader 
with the possibility that the nature of political life depends to a great 
extent upon regime type. Agrippa stresses, for instance, that those who 
inhabit a democracy wish only success for their equals (4.6). Monarchical 
subjects, on the other hand, contemn their fellow citizens and hope that 
they suffer hardships (5.2). He asserts, moreover, that strife, though key 
to monarchies, is incidental to democracies (13.6).
But Agrippa’s rosy assessment of democracy cannot obscure the 
gloomy take on political life that the oration promotes. He hopes to 
present the impression that democracies cultivate a different political 
culture, but his Thucydidean appraisals of human nature undercut this 
conclusion.37 Regardless of the type of government that presides over a 
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state, Agrippa maintains that punishment of wrongdoers is a fundamen-
tal necessity, since most transgressors are incapable of improving their 
behavior through any other means (7.1). Even democracies experience 
their share of political instability; among their strengths, according to 
Agrippa, is their severe punishment of would-be tyrants (9.1). Although 
there remain differences based on regime types, Agrippa portrays politi-
cal life as conflict-ridden and rife with political opponents. He supports 
democracy because it purportedly eschews many of the flaws that plague 
tyrannies, given the assumption that the political universe remains fun-
damentally conflictual. 
The Maecenas Speech. As is the case with the Agrippa oration, Dio’s 
Maecenas speech touches on answers to these queries only insofar as 
they pertain to the realm of domestic politics. Although he favors a dif-
ferent future for the Roman state, his Maecenas offers a similar assess-
ment of political life and human nature. In many ways, the Maecenas 
address presents conclusions based on the same premises one detects in 
the Agrippan corollary. Maecenas, for instance, proffers an equally pes-
simistic take on the political universe. In Maecenas’ case, this pessimism 
depends partly on governmental types. 
Much as one would expect from an oration criticizing Agrippa’s 
advice to Octavian, the Maecenas address appears especially cynical 
about the political life of a democratic state. Since it fails to promote a 
hierarchical society in which the “best” receive their just desserts, democ-
racy, Maecenas asserts, leads to common ruin (κοινὸν . . . ὄλεθρον, 14.5).38
Similarly, he focuses on the viciousness of one’s political opponents in 
a democratic order: such men will ultimately undo a man’s legislative 
accomplishments (17.4). Maecenas even mentions Rome’s republican 
past as an example of the civil strife that engulfs democracies—especially 
powerful ones (15.6). In general, the oration’s gloominess pertains to its 
withering indictment of democracy. Ordering the state as a monarchy, 
Maecenas argues, can at least ensure Octavian’s safety (18.6).39
Yet the speech’s cynical assessment of political life is not merely 
related to the form of government it opposes. One notes great pessimism 
in the Maecenas oration, and this colors its overall portrait of the political 
universe. Maecenas, for instance, in part argues for monarchy by offering 
a captious appraisal of most citizens; Octavian, he avers, recognizing the 
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incompetence of the populace, should put a stop to its insolence (14.3). 
Maecenas also assumes that one’s political opponents are so vicious 
that it would be dangerous for Octavian to abdicate his power (17.2). 
To Maecenas, the political universe is so conflict-ridden that Octavian’s 
response must be the establishment of a monarchy. He further stresses 
that troubles ultimately confound large and powerful states—regardless 
of the type of government they possess (16.2).
Dio’s Maecenas appears to proffer a similarly bleak assessment 
of political life—one rooted in his view of human nature. To him, only 
a properly regimented society guards against otherwise inevitable con-
flicts. Although Maecenas maintains that Octavian can ameliorate the 
conflict-ridden nature of political life, he also stresses that he will only do 
so if he follows Maecenas’ advice (18.6). Not just any monarchy will do; 
Octavian must establish his government according to Maecenas’ rules or 
problems are bound to brew. As we have already mentioned, Maecenas 
believes that problems would fester for Rome regardless, insofar as it 
was a mighty and prosperous state.
Dio’s History. Similar sentiments about the nature of the political universe 
abound in Dio’s history. The historian presents, for instance, numerous 
examples of pessimism in regard to human nature. Mankind, Dio avers, 
is such that people fail to recognize their happiness until misfortune 
removes it (56.45.1). According to Dio’s Livia, malefactors greatly out-
number those who hope to do good (55.14.5); in part for this reason, 
she contends, if Augustus were to punish his subjects properly, he would 
be compelled to kill most of mankind (55.20.4).40 Although men always 
remember their anger towards those who have injured them, Dio informs 
us, they forget those from whom they have received benefits (46.34.2). 
Dio likewise contends that people abide by compacts only insofar as it 
remains advantageous to do so (fr. 46.2). In short, Dio maintains—in 
both the Agrippa and Maecenas addresses as well as in his history as a 
whole—that human beings are selfish and inclined to transgressions.41
Even in regard to the much-lauded emperor Titus, Dio suggests that he 
may have been a good ruler only because his short reign did not offer 
him opportunities for wrongdoing (66[66].18.3–5).
Dio’s history also presents evidence of its author’s views on the 
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conflictual nature of political life. Given his pessimism about human 
motivations, it is not surprising that the historian maintains such an 
outlook. According to Dio, for example, Ancus Marcius discovered that 
a state cannot remain safe simply by striving for peace; rather, a concil-
iatory policy on its own courts doom, since a lack of aggression leads to 
ruin (fr. 8.1). It is natural, Dio suggests, for most human beings to fight 
against an opponent even when it does not remain in their interest to 
do so (fr. 20.4). More broadly, as far as Dio’s Augustus is concerned, all 
benefits are mixed with unpleasantness, and the greatest evils accompany 
the best blessings (56.8.2).
One notes in the history echoes of specific points Dio has Agrippa 
and Maecenas voice in the debate. Both Agrippa (4.4, 5.4) and Augustus 
(55.15.1), for example, suggest that monarchs are especially susceptible 
to envy and treachery. Dio elsewhere relates that people always distrust 
tyrants (fr. 40.15). Even during the Roman Republic, Dio maintains, 
prominent statesmen incurred the jealousy of their fellow citizens. Julius 
Caesar, for instance, favored bestowing Pompey with the command 
against Mithridates because, Dio tells us, additional honors were bound 
to render Pompey envied and odious (36.43.4). Dio relates that Pompey 
for the same reason opposed the selection of him to a command against 
Mediterranean pirates (36.26.1–2). This matches the conflict-ridden 
description of democratic politics promoted by Maecenas (cf. 15.6, 17.4). 
Just as Dio’s Agrippa contends that Octavian’s subjects will believe he 
always hoped to enslave them (2.4), moreover, Dio maintains that Caesar’s 
feigned distress over Pompey’s death incited ridicule, since Caesar aimed 
to establish a monarchy (42.8). Overall, it appears as if the conflictual 
nature of political life described in both the Agrippa and Maecenas ora-
tions matches Dio’s general outlook.
The combined pessimism of the two speeches on this score may 
serve to intensify the gloominess for the reader. Both speakers promote 
the idea that the world is harsh, but their advice can largely remove the 
strife inherent to political life. Yet the two advisors also present argu-
ments that speak against the effectiveness of their rival’s counsel. Agrippa 
maintains that human nature is too flawed to make for a happy monarchy; 
Maecenas asserts that human nature is too pernicious to ensure a stable 
democracy. Given the author’s pessimism about political life, readers 
may conclude that both speakers are correct. Perhaps Rome, as a mighty 
Empire, is bound to fail.
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(P 2) What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s 
fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic or 
must one be pessimistic on this score, and in what respects the one  
and/or the other?
The Agrippa Speech. Toward the start of the speech, Dio’s Agrippa makes 
clear that his commentary aims for what is best for Octavian personally, 
as well as what is best for the state as a whole (2.2). Accordingly, though 
the oration does not directly answer all the questions posed in P 2, it 
suggests that Agrippa has fundamental political values and aspirations in 
mind. Throughout the speech, he appears to take for granted that both 
democracies and monarchies work toward the same goals. The differ-
ence, according to the Agrippa address, is that democracies stand a far 
better chance of realizing these aspirations. The oration offers numerous 
purported reasons why a monarch cannot rule a state well; its focus on 
this issue suggests that good governance is the ultimate—if rather nebu-
lous—political aspiration.
According to Agrippa, monarchies’ failures in this regard are legion. 
It remains difficult, for example, for a king to establish a fair judiciary, 
since judges will want to acquit the accused as a means to demonstrate 
their power (7.2).42 Agrippa also avers that it is dangerous for a monarch 
to entrust the administration of state affairs to good men, because they 
will inevitably aim to overthrow the authoritarian government (8.4–5). 
In another demonstration of this same contention, the oration suggests 
that the human race will not countenance a monarch (4.3–4). Agrippa 
further believes that Rome’s historical circumstances render the transi-
tion to a kingship even more fraught. He asserts that it is troublesome 
to establish a monarchy in a state whose populace has lived so long in 
freedom (5.4, 13.3).
All this may lead one to believe that the Agrippa address aims to 
demonstrate the impossibility of realizing fundamental political aspira-
tions under a monarchical regime. After all, the speech stresses the greater 
facility with which democracies operate. Agrippa asserts, for instance, that 
democracies encourage good behavior in their citizens (4.7); this suggests 
that it would not be difficult for Octavian to realize his aspirations, since 
democracy already promoted a body politic inclined toward beneficent 
ends. Further, when instructing Octavian to implement reforms before 
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abdicating his power, he argues that the most important of these laws will 
stand the test of time (13.5). Democracies, in addition, can punish citizens 
who vie for tyranny (9.1). Overall, Agrippa stresses the comparative ease 
with which a democracy can function salubriously.
As was the case with Dio’s responses to P 1, however, there are 
hints of cynicism in the speech. Although his Agrippa remains more 
sanguine about the prospect of good governance in a democratic regime, 
he is not a dyed-in-the-wool optimist. In fact, the oration stresses that it 
is difficult to set up a salutary state of affairs in a democracy too—even 
though it remains vastly more troublesome to do so as a monarch (5.3).43
Despite his recommendations in favor of democracy, Agrippa does not 
see harmonious political life entirely as an outgrowth of the proper form 
of governance. The realization of political goals is far from automatic. 
For this reason, the speech recognizes that Octavian himself, if he rees-
tablishes the Republic, cannot ensure the resilience of his own political 
program (13.5). To Agrippa, a monarch should harbor no illusions about 
actualizing proper political aspirations, since these aspirations are unat-
tainable for a kingship. In a democracy, however, there are grounds for 
cautious optimism: democracy’s nature renders likely—though by no 
means certain—the prospects for success. Even in an address touting 
the great advantages of democracy, Dio cannot help but express some 
skepticism about its preferred form of governance.
The Maecenas Speech. Dio’s Maecenas speech essentially offers the same 
responses to P 2, though it touts monarchy as the more likely vehicle 
to realize proper political aspirations. It is unfortunate that the start of 
this oration has not survived, because our beginning makes clear that 
Maecenas had been addressing the prospects for success under disparate 
constitutions (14.1). Even so, the speech contains numerous sentiments 
aimed at demonstrating the futility of any attempt to realize political 
goals and values in a democratic state. To Maecenas, all democracies are 
doomed to failure. As we noted previously, according to the speech, mob 
rule leads to ruin for all (14.5). Such governments are congenitally rife with 
civil and foreign wars (15.5). Given their lack of leadership, democracies 
are rudderless (16.3), and thus the establishment of a democratic form of 
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government would destroy Octavian’s prospects for attaining his political 
aspirations. In a direct refutation of sentiments Agrippa expressed (13.5), 
Maecenas makes clear that in a democracy Octavian’s—or any other 
man’s—accomplishments will be quickly undone (17.4). 
Although his harping on democracies’ deficiencies should be crystal 
clear, Maecenas also puts forth reasons why a Roman democracy would 
be an even more certain failure. He asserts that it is especially difficult to 
administer a large and powerful democracy, given the size of the popula-
tion (15.6). This contention does not fit well with another proposed in 
the selfsame speech—that there is little toil involved in maintaining any 
(presumably monarchical) state, as opposed to expanding it (18.5).44 Still, 
it manages to underscore the purported inability of democratic leaders 
to accomplish their political goals.
The address maintains that it remains easier for monarchs to suc-
ceed on this score. To Maecenas, one ought to attribute this to the way in 
which a monarchy properly orders society. By allowing for a supposedly 
meritocratic administration, a kingship promotes human happiness; for 
the same reason, a monarchy can avoid hazardous foreign wars and civil 
strife (15.4).45 Provided they promote a hierarchical society in which the 
“best” receive their proper desserts, monarchies should lead to great 
blessings for their populaces.
This sentiment, however, hints at the fact that Maecenas does not 
believe that the realization of political aspirations is an automatic out-
growth of a particular regime type. Some ideas in the speech actually 
stress the difficulties inherent in monarchs’ political successes. Maecenas 
recognizes, for example, the inherent (though supposedly worthwhile) 
risks involved in establishing a kingship (18.1). Even a king can fail to 
fulfill a state’s proper political goals. Monarchies that do not promote a 
properly ordered society are similarly doomed to failure. The address’ 
optimism does not pertain to all monarchies—only a monarchy rightly 
guided according to Maecenas’ political program (18.7).
The two counterpoised orations could together reinforce a sense of 
pessimism on Dio’s part. In this instance, they may serve to underscore 
the notion that it remains exceptionally difficult to attain one’s political 
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aspirations, regardless of a state’s constitution. Each speaker does not 
hope to make this appear true for his preferred system of governance, but 
the way in which both addresses gainsay the efficacy of their opponent’s 
arguments may leave the reader with this impression. This is perhaps a 
surprising conclusion concerning a debate that appears at least partly 
aimed at influencing political life in Dio’s own day.
Dio’s History. As was the case with his Agrippa and Maecenas addresses, 
Dio elsewhere in his work suggests that there are ways to maximize a 
leader’s chances to reach his political goals, though there are also reasons 
to retain a sense of pessimism about his prospects. In one fragment from 
the history, for example, Dio asserts that precaution and calculation can 
usually assure success (fr. 32.13). Moderation, Dio elsewhere contends, 
remains a crucial quality for fruitful endeavors (fr. 32.14; fr. 52). 
Yet Dio appears to believe that most people do not incline toward 
caution and moderation and thus do not have the opportunity to enjoy 
long-term victories; in fact, Dio maintains that success itself is to blame 
for men’s failures, since it encourages in them an overconfident casual-
ness that leads to ruin (fr. 26.3; fr. 36.25).46 In advice he imparts to the 
exiled Cicero, moreover, Dio’s philosopher Philiscus argues that man’s 
victories are ephemeral (38.27.1).47 Elsewhere, Dio contends that the 
justness of a particular cause does not ensure its political success (fr. 
5.4).48 Even very formidable people, Dio avers, cannot be certain of their 
power (79[78].41.1). On the whole, the perspective on political success Dio 
reveals in the Agrippa-Maecenas debate seems analogous to that offered 
in the history itself. In both cases, one notes a large dollop of pessimism.49
(P 3) Is the political future predictable? In what sense and  
to what extent?
The Agrippa Speech. To some degree, the Agrippa-Maecenas debate 
amounts to a less effective text to consider Dio’s views on these ques-
tions. Both his interlocutors naturally aim to argue that they can predict 
the future, since they hope to offer Octavian a rationale to establish a 
certain sort of government. The arguments in favor of a particular course 
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of action understandably revolve—at least in part—around the idea that 
the advisor can foresee the advantages and disadvantages to come. It 
would naturally seem ineffective to tout a program for the future while 
disavowing all knowledge of its impact. Thus the dialogue’s nature tilts 
Dio’s views in a particular direction.
Yet both speeches present evidence to suggest firm responses to 
these queries. The Agrippa address, for example, demonstrates that mon-
archies predictably promote disastrous results. By focusing on the ways 
in which kingship is purportedly incompatible with human nature, the 
oration signals the inevitable troubles ahead for the aspiring monarch. 
People ultimately cannot countenance kingship (4.3); its instability is both 
predictable and inevitable. Similarly, whereas democratic citizens gladly 
make contributions to their state’s needs (6.2), in monarchies they do 
not (6.3). If a ruler bestows honors capriciously, his failure is preordained 
(12.6). This suggests that Agrippa’s view of human nature necessitates 
specific political outcomes.
The notion that the future is largely predictable seems to accord 
with Dio’s Thucydidean take on people’s motivations. Since he appears 
to believe that human nature is fixed, it follows that one should be able 
to divine political outcomes avant la lettre.50 Interestingly, though, the 
Agrippa speech seems less assured in forecasting later successes. To be 
certain, the address highlights some inevitabilities for a democratic state: 
that its strife will be incidental (13.6), for example. But Agrippa appears 
less sure of democratic achievements than he is of monarchical failures. 
This serves to underscore Dio’s inherent pessimism.
The Maecenas Speech. The response of Dio’s Maecenas presents less 
evidence pertaining to the predictability of the political future. It remains 
difficult, therefore, to compare and contrast this aspect of the two ora-
tions. Yet the Maecenas address offers one statement that reinforces the 
impression noted above. When one decides on the proper government 
to establish, Maecenas contends, it is important to weigh the results that 
come from them (14.3). This suggests, on Maecenas’ part, that one can 
foresee consequences in advance. This matches the Agrippa address’ 
use of history to demonstrate future outcomes. As long as the Greeks 
lived under monarchies, Agrippa maintains, they accomplished nothing 
noteworthy; when they inhabited democracies, they proved extremely 
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successful (9.2–3). Although Dio himself may have disagreed with the 
content of this argument,51 this does not imply that he would have gain-
said its premise—that the human past can predict the future. In fact, 
both speeches take for granted that the experiences of Greeks, Romans, 
and even barbarians will demonstrate what the future holds. They thus 
reveal a shared faith in the predictability of the future and the utility of 
historical analogy for determining cause and effect.
Dio’s History. In his history as a whole, Dio seems less optimistic about 
the prospects for divining the future. According to Dio, the outcome of 
battles is particularly inscrutable.52 Thus, for instance, Dio avers that Aulus 
Bucius Lappius Maximus did not deserve praise for his defeat of Lucius 
Antonius Saturninus’ revolt against Domitian, because many command-
ers have won unexpected military victories (67[67].11.1). Dio stresses, 
furthermore, that even Elagabalus’ tutor Gannys, a military novice, fared 
well in battle (79[78].38.3; 80[79].6.1). Dio also hints that portents are not 
always easily interpreted; the exact same omen can foreshadow drastically 
different outcomes when directed toward different people. The portents 
visited upon Trajan and Manius Acilius Glabrio during their consulship of 
91 c.E., for example, foretold the emperorship for the former and death 
for the latter (67[67].12.1).53
To be sure, in Dio’s history one also detects inklings of a more moral 
conception of the universe, which assures future success for the dutiful 
and honorable. As we noted above, Dio maintains that calculation and 
precaution often determine victory, whereas a lack of foresight neces-
sitates ruin (fr. 32.13). But Dio’s views on human nature most often lend 
a gloomy cast to the future. This does not merely pertain to the military 
realm but also holds true for political events. Thus Dio perceives that 
the Roman populace’s transfer of support from Otho to Vitellius makes 
sense: people praise others as their fortunes shift, not according to their 
deservedness (64[65].1–2). Similarly, the historian asserts that injustice 
often prevails in the world (fr. 36.21). 
Dio appears more certain of future outcomes in the Agrippa-
Maecenas debate than in other places in his history. As we previously 
discussed, this likely relates to the specific character of the dialogue, one 
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that argues in favor of particular regime types partly through estimations 
of their future effects. Yet we have ample evidence, from both the debate 
itself and the history proper, to conclude that Dio remained largely pes-
simistic about the time to come. 
(P 4) How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical 
development? What is one’s role in “moving” or “shaping” history in the 
desired direction?
The Agrippa Speech. In order to make monarchy appear a less attractive 
option to Octavian, Dio’s Agrippa expends much energy stressing the 
degree to which a king lacks agency over affairs in his state. Throughout 
the oration, he underscores a monarch’s inability to shape the future. 
The address mentions, for instance, the difficulties besetting kings who 
attempt to raise revenues, since their subjects resist paying taxes (6.3).54
Agrippa also highlights a ruler’s incapacity to run the state on his own 
(8.3–4, 10.1); to make matters worse, a king cannot safely choose com-
petent subordinates to aid him (8.4–8). Nor can a monarch convince the 
populace that he is a fair-minded judge (7.4). In regard to matters over 
which a ruler maintains control, Agrippa attempts to minimize their 
importance. Thus he argues that a tyrant may save lives, enrich people, 
and harm enemies, but these do not outweigh more pressing problems 
(11.1). A king, further, cannot satisfy all those who ask for favors (12.1).
In only one instance does Agrippa offer the impression that a 
ruler plays a key role in shaping his monarchy. According to him, citi-
zens in a kingdom naturally take on the character of their tyrant (5.2). 
This superficially suggests an extraordinary role in controlling historical 
development on the part of a king: he even molds his subjects’ disposi-
tions. In reality, however, this does not amount to significant agency for 
the monarch; Agrippa assumes that this unavoidably leads to disaster: 
tyrants are ineluctably horrid, and thus their citizens will be similarly 
malign. This molding of character occurs naturally, and not as the result 
of a ruler’s will.
Whereas Agrippa focuses attention on a monarch’s incapacity to 
shape historical events, he also tries to convince the reader that a law-
giver in a democratic state will not prove similarly feckless. He informs 
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Octavian that in settling affairs for the Republic, his most important laws 
will stand the test of time (13.5). This does not amount to the strongest 
argument: Agrippa cannot contend that Octavian’s program for reform 
would survive wholesale in a democracy. He spends little time on this 
matter, in comparison with his repeated attempts to demonstrate a 
monarch’s futility. Still, Agrippa avers that a king has no mastery over 
historical development, whereas a prominent politician in a democratic 
state possesses at least some ability to shape affairs.
The Maecenas Speech. Dio’s Maecenas both emphasizes a democratic 
citizen’s incapacity to control historical development and highlights a 
king’s powers in this regard. To be sure, he suggests that his interlocu-
tor’s points on this topic are not entirely incorrect: a tyrant cannot shape 
history in the direction he desires (cf. 15.1). According to Maecenas, how-
ever, Agrippa remains wrong in attributing this view to all monarchies. 
In numerous places, the Maecenas address implies that a king—when 
properly guided—possesses a grand ability to control historical develop-
ment. At the speech’s beginning, for example, he implores Octavian to 
reorganize Rome and steer it in a more moderate direction (14.1). This 
suggests great power on Octavian’s part to shape the state as he sees 
fit. Moreover, the oration contends that a monarch, together with his 
advisors, can ensure that a state enjoys various blessings, avoids foreign 
entanglements, and eschews civil strife (15.4). Even in the realm of foreign 
affairs, Maecenas argues that a monarch remains in a position of mastery.
The speech contrasts this perception of kingship with pessimistic 
commentary on the role of democratic citizens in shaping historical 
development. This includes a direct refutation of a point Dio’s Agrippa 
mustered (13.5): much of Sulla’s legislation, Maecenas argues, was undone 
during his lifetime (17.4).55 To Maecenas, even a dictator in a democracy 
cannot maintain mastery over the future, and cannot direct the state in 
the direction he hopes.56 For this reason, the address concludes that a large 
democracy such as the Roman Republic is incapable of accomplishing 
anything (15.6).
The responses of the speeches to the questions posed in P 4 suggest 
that matters of agency played an important role in the way Dio argued 
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his points in the debate. The two orations support their preferred system 
of governance by highlighting the control their leaders possess over the 
state’s character and future. At the same time, they both deny agency to 
leaders in their rival’s choice of government in order to undermine his 
arguments. Dio’s answers to P 4, therefore, are ultimately regime depen-
dent: political leaders can shape history only in the speaker’s favored 
forms of government. This conclusion subtly hints at the difficulties Dio 
perceives in leaders’ attempts to gain mastery over historical events. 
Although Agrippa proves more sanguine about democratic politicians’ 
abilities in this regard, we have seen that he hardly emphasizes the matter. 
Maecenas, furthermore, believes that only a rightly guided monarch can 
shape affairs in the matter of his choosing. To some extent, this impres-
sion results from the dialogue’s agonistic character: the speakers aim to 
demonstrate the benefits of their favored form of government. Maecenas, 
importantly, believes that a well-advised Roman emperor can mold the 
future as it suits him. According to him, it is perhaps not the ruler who 
possesses agency in a monarchy so much as the clever advisor.
Dio’s History. Various passages in Dio’s history reinforce the debate’s 
subtle sense of pessimism regarding a leader’s shaping of events. The 
work stresses the ephemerality of human achievement. Philiscus informs 
Cicero, for example, that successes usher in failures, especially in times of 
factional strife (38.27.1). Undue victories, Dio tells us, lead to misfortune, 
since they eclipse one’s concern for temperance (fr. 39.3). According to 
Dio, even as talented a commander as Hannibal could not change fortune’s 
influence on battles (fr. 32.18). Although Dio offers the impression that 
moderation is key to sustained success, his history suggests that a leader 
lacks the ability to shape affairs (cf. 38.21.1).
In regard to one point, Dio presents sentiments that match those 
attributed to Agrippa in the debate. The historian, like his Agrippa (5.2), 
claims that a tyrant can influence his subjects’ behavior for the worse. 
Thus Dio maintains that Nero’s licentious activities in Rome prompted 
citizens to engage in similar acts of disorder and depravity (61[61].8.1–2). 
He likewise informs us that Otho’s excessive gifts and attention encour-
aged lawlessness among his soldiery (63[64].9.2–3). Dio also asserts that 
Vitellius’ troops lacked restraint because their leader suffered from the 
same flaw (64[65].4.4). Both in the Agrippa-Maecenas debate and in his 
narrative as a whole, Dio appears most convinced of a leader’s negative 
impact on historical development. As was the case with our answers to 
P 1–P 3, a sense of pessimism dominates. 
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(P 5) What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in  
historical development?
The Agrippa Speech. The Agrippa-Maecenas debate focuses little 
attention on matters of chance. As a result, neither address offers much 
guidance on Dio’s potential answers to this query. Perhaps the debate’s 
character—given the speakers’ goal of exhorting Octavian to follow a 
specific plan of action—does not leave much room for matters of fortune 
and indeterminacy. Our answers stemming from the dialogue, accordingly, 
are limited.
Dio’s Agrippa presents only a few remarks that pertain to the sig-
nificance of chance in human affairs. Toward the beginning of his speech, 
he chastises human beings for attributing their successes to their own 
powers, while blaming their failures on divine will (2.6). From this senti-
ment—which seems linked to Dio’s pessimism about human nature—it 
is difficult to divine the oration’s view of chance’s import. Another sen-
timent in the address seems similarly unhelpful for our concerns: men 
ought not, Agrippa maintains, abuse the gifts of fortune, and thereupon 
wrong others (3.1). This suggests that the speech sees a role for chance 
in historical development, but Agrippa’s failure to elaborate on this score 
does not leave us with much in the way of evidence.
The Maecenas Speech. Dio’s response from Maecenas is a bit more 
helpful. The oration suggests that Octavian owes his current power over 
Rome to fortune and implores him to obey her—obviously by remain-
ing in control of the state as its monarch (18.3). Maecenas also claims 
that the Romans ought to rejoice because fortune has freed them from 
civil strife and granted Octavian the role of organizing the state (18.4). 
Elsewhere in the address, Maecenas avers that Octavian’s current power 
demonstrates the gods’ pity for Rome (16.4).
These comments together suggest an important role on the part 
of chance in human affairs. The speech maintains, for instance, that 
Octavian does not owe his success entirely to his own powers; fortune 
obviously plays some part in historical development. Yet Maecenas does 
not elaborate on this matter, and thus it seems difficult to intuit his views 
with any more precision. It remains possible that appeals to fortune here 
are essentially pro forma. After all, throughout much of the philosophical 
portion of the debate, the two speakers assert that following particular 
courses of action will ensure the fruition of predetermined results. Such 
arguments do not leave much room for chance.
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57 See also 38.28.1–2. 
58 Cf. 38.39.3, where Caesar tells his officers that Fortune supports Rome. At 56.24.2, 
Dio informs us that Augustus attributed the disaster of Varus (9 c.E.) to divine wrath.
59 Cf. fr. 32.18; fr. 40.37–38.
60 Cf. 79(78).24.2.
61 See, for example, 63(64).1.2, where Dio grants both Fortune and Galba free will.
62This suggests that Swan’s 2004, 11, estimation of Dio’s political universe is too rosy. 
For more on this topic, see below.
63 I have slightly altered the original question posed by George 1969, 205: “What is 
the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?” As is common with 
George’s instrumental queries, his question seems aimed at the foreign policy realm. The 
more general query I have posited allows for a fuller response. 
Dio’s History. We must turn elsewhere to settle this matter more con-
cretely. Thankfully, the remainder of the history offers many examples of 
Dio’s views on the role of chance. This should perhaps come as no sur-
prise, given Dio’s stated devotion to his patron goddess Τύχη (“Fortune,” 
73[72].23.3–4).57 Yet Dio’s various pronouncements on chance often seem 
to lack consistency. At times Dio appears to suggest that human beings 
inhabit a moral universe; for this reason, Fortune favors the good. Thus, 
for example, Dio suggests that Romulus and Numa had divine guidance 
(fr. 6.5).58 Dio also criticizes Tiberius Gracchus for supposing that one 
properly evaluates deeds according chance, rather than according to their 
intrinsic worth (fr. 83.2). 
In other places, however, Dio presents a more capricious and amoral 
view of fortune. His discussion of the Second Samnite War, for example, 
highlights the ways in which Τύχη subjected both the Samnites and the 
Romans to the same humiliations, thereby displaying her omnipotence 
(fr. 36.22).59 Dio’s Cicero, in a speech offered in the aftermath of Caesar’s 
assassination, suggests that both the just and unjust must tolerate the vicis-
situdes of chance and that the righteous are not guaranteed good results 
(44.27.2). According to Dio, moreover, power does not insulate people 
from fortune’s whims (37.10.3).60 Although it appears as if Dio grants 
agency in his history to both human beings and Fortune,61 he remains 
unclear about the precise nature of divine will’s role in terrestrial affairs.62
VI. THE INSTRUMENTAL QUESTIONS
(I 1) What is the best approach for selecting political goals or 
objectives?63
The Maecenas Speech. Although Dio’s Maecenas does not dilate on the 
proper way to select political goals, we can glean some of his thoughts on 
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concept of human nature to historical events.” On this topic, see also Rich 1989, 91; Adler 
2011a, 146–47.
the matter from desultory comments in the instrumental portion of his 
speech.64 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Maecenas oration emphasizes the 
importance of determining political objectives that accord with human 
nature. Maecenas informs Octavian that he should not punish lawbreakers 
too severely, since men are congenitally inclined to wrongdoing (34.6). 
He further contends that Octavian ought not trust informants too readily; 
sordid motives may underlie their testimony (37.2–3).
The Maecenas address also mentions the importance of public 
opinion to a king’s choice of goals. When deciding a particular course 
of action, it counsels, Octavian should contemplate whether his decision 
will ensure his subjects’ affection or not; the ruler must choose options 
that will encourage the citizenry’s esteem for him (38.2). This sentiment 
sits poorly with Dio’s depiction of humanity’s baseness: given Dio’s cyni-
cism about peoples’ motivations, one might expect Octavian’s subjects 
to admire him for ignoble reasons. Such a conclusion corresponds with 
some scholarly opinions of Dio’s own thought; according to Reinhold, 
for instance, the historian’s mix of Thucydidean pessimism and moral 
instruction sometimes fails to convince.65
Dio’s Maecenas also suggests the importance of a ruler’s advisors 
when one contemplates the correct course of action. A king makes superior 
decisions, he avers, when a talented team of counselors aid him (19.4–5). 
This will not hold true if the monarch fails to employ the “best” men as 
his guides. Such advice implies that a monarch ought not select objectives 
on his own. It remains fundamental, furthermore, for Octavian to offer 
the appearance of political plurality in his decision-making. Only in the 
case of commanders revolting from his authority should Octavian bypass 
the Senate’s opinion and treat the rebels as public enemies (31.10). To 
Maecenas, a ruler must assess the danger of a situation and only choose 
an openly authoritarian solution when the circumstances are life threat-
ening. When this fails to be the case, it is best for a king to present the 
illusion that he is not the state’s ultimate authority. One again detects a 
discordant note: this Machiavellian contention may not mix well with the 
oration’s emphasis on the monarch’s strength of character.
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66 E.g., Swan 2004, 4: “Elitist to the core, Dio regarded the Senate, of which he was 
a senior member, as the universal ruling order, a caste defined by class, superior cultural 
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ate, see, e.g., Meyer 1891, 16–24; Jardé 1925, 29–32; Bleicken 1962, 457–67; van Stekelenburg 
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Steidle 1988, 209–11. At 79(78).40.3–41.4, Dio criticizes Macrinus for becoming emperor 
without having served in the Senate.
67 Cf. Dio’s criticism of Commodus on similar grounds (73[72].1.2).
68 Dio asserts (57.13.6) that Germanicus’ death marked Tiberius’ turn from good to 
bad emperor. On Tiberius’ early pro-senatorial policy, see also 57.15.8–9.
69 Cf. fr. 70.4–9, where Dio praises Scipio Africanus’ preparedness in war, which 
removed the necessity of deliberation. See also fr. 16, where Dio stresses the importance 
of solo deliberation.
70 E.g., fr. 11.2–6; fr. 36.1–4; fr. 36.11–14; 43.15.3–16.1; 56.40.7. For a discussion of Dio’s 
concern for clemency, see Adler 2011a.
71 I have again slightly altered the original question George 1969, 211, posed: “How 
are the goals of action pursued most effectively?” George’s query appears chiefly aimed 
at foreign affairs. The question’s recasting permits a more general answer.
Dio’s History. The sentiments Dio’s Maecenas offers appear compatible 
with those detectable elsewhere in his work. As scholars have long noted, 
Dio’s history demonstrates deep concern for senatorial prerogatives.66 Dio 
even lauds Maecenas for remaining an equestrian, despite his influence 
with Augustus (55.7.4). Thus the Maecenas speech’s regard for senators’ 
input in the decision-making process fits Dio’s hierarchical conception of 
proper governance. The absence of advisors, Dio thought, courts disaster 
for a leader. According to the historian, for example, errors plagued Cara-
calla’s reign because the emperor pertinaciously clung to his own opinions 
and failed to seek learned counsel (78[77]11.5).67 Dio lauds Nerva for 
relying on the advice of foremost men (68[68].2.3). He even praises the 
early years of Tiberius’ reign, because the emperor allowed the senators 
to deliberate on state affairs (57.7.2–6).68 In other parts of his work, Dio 
also maintains that deliberation is a prerequisite for political success (fr. 
32.15; fr. 54.1).69 The Maecenas address’ suggestion that Octavian offer 
mild punishments for lawbreakers (34.6), furthermore, echoes numerous 
pleas for clemency throughout the history.70 
(I 2) How are political goals pursued most effectively?71
The Maecenas Speech. The Maecenas address posits a number of answers 
to this question. One key to the successful pursuit of political aims per-
tains to Maecenas’ perception of the proper ordering of society. Dio’s 
Maecenas offers the impression that a rigidly hierarchical social order is 
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73 Cf. 52.20.3, which reiterates the necessity of an emperor selecting subordinates 
with neither senatorial nor popular input. The same holds true, thinks Dio’s Maecenas, in 
regard to the army: the hardiest men ought to serve as professional soldiers, since they will 
prove the most effective fighters (52.27.4–5).
74 Cf. 52.33.5.
75 Cf. 52.34.1. According to Millar 1964, 111, these sorts of sentiments on the part of 
Dio’s Maecenas are boilerplate.
76 Edwards 1993, esp. 4.
a prerequisite for effective political action, since it is well regimented and 
puts the management of state affairs in the hands of the most meritorious 
members. For this reason, the speech expatiates on the suitable adminis-
trative roles of various classes. Maecenas also advocates the regulation 
of state business along class lines. The oration opposes the amassing of 
power at court by freedmen (37.5–6)—men whose lowly station renders 
them unsuitable to play important roles in the conduct of affairs. In part 
to reinforce the hierarchical nature of this optimal monarchy, Maecenas 
supports state-run education for future senators and equestrians (26.1).72
Only such men, as a result of their schooling, would possess the requisite 
background to take on weighty administrative roles.
Maecenas also contends that effective political action requires a 
ruler to select the noblest, wealthiest, and most capable citizens as advi-
sors, magistrates, and underlings. The address recommends that Octavian 
personally appoint all senators (19.1) and equestrians (19.4) in order to 
ensure that the undeserving do not remain in their posts.73 Further, it is 
beneficial for the government to have experienced agents involved in 
its administration (25.4).74 Thus an essential aspect of effective political 
action for Maecenas pertains to an emperor surrounding himself with 
the best cast of characters. This policy has the added benefit of purport-
edly making the emperor safer, since this large and capable elite, having 
a share in government, will not rebel (cf. 19.4–6).
The speech associates successful political action with the character of 
the ruler. If the king proves frugal in his personal affairs and lavishes funds 
on the state, for instance, Maecenas argues that his subjects will gladly 
pay taxes (29.2–3). In essence, Octavian must be the sort of leader whom 
he would want ruling over him (39.2).75 This emphasis on the emperor’s 
temperament seems typical of Roman ruminations on political matters. 
As Edwards has argued, the Romans had a penchant for personalizing 
issues that we in the modern world tend to characterize in other ways.76
505DIO’S AGRIPPA-MAECENAS DEBATE
77 See, e.g., Zawadzki 1983, 310–11; Reinhold 1988, 203.
78 On this topic, see Reinhold 1988, 192–94.
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It is thus unsurprising that Maecenas informs Octavian that the optimal 
ruler must be the best and have the best helpers (26.2).
More intriguingly, the oration equates local governance with effec-
tive management. This assessment, however, should not be confused with 
an endorsement of provincial autonomy; the oration—though the product 
of a distinguished member of the Empire’s Greek elite—opposes local 
coinages and other manifestations of colonial self-rule (30.9).77 Although 
an advocate for the centralization of the Imperial administration, Mae-
cenas still stresses the value of the proximity of the state’s agents to the 
affairs they manage. Thus he supports the parceling of Italy into smaller 
districts, each with its own administrator (22.6).78 One must be mindful, 
he contends, not to grant responsibilities so large to governors that they 
cannot properly perform them. The same holds true, Maecenas believes, 
for the ruler himself. The emperor should never make full use of his 
power, nor desire to accomplish everything (38.1). The address suggests 
that political actions are most potently pursued when they remain man-
ageable, and when the ruler has not accorded himself too many tasks. 
Maecenas perceives limits to what an emperor can reasonably achieve, 
despite his ultimate control of the state.
Dio’s History. One can find echoes of many of these sentiments in other 
portions of Dio’s history. We have already discussed Dio’s abiding concern 
with the maintenance of senatorial perquisites. The historian also views 
education as an appropriate means to distinguish worthy members of 
the elite from the great unwashed. Dio, for instance, proves critical of 
Marcus Bassaeus Rufus, a praetorian prefect during the rule of Marcus 
Aurelius, for his paltry education (72[71].5.2); the historian rebukes 
Oclantius Adventus for the same reason (79[78].14.1–2). He informs us 
that a lack of educational attainments exposed a man falsely claiming to 
be the distinguished Sextus Quintillius Condianus (73[72].6.5), and Dio 
condemns Caracalla for proving contemptuous of the properly educated 
(78[77].13.6).79
The concern Dio’s Maecenas demonstrates for the pursuit of modest 
political goals (38.1) fits with the historian’s antirevolutionary tempera-
ment.80 Especially in its early books, the Historia Romana places emphasis 
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on the value of σωφροσύνη (“moderation”). This quality, Dio argues, 
wins and preserves victories (fr. 32.14), and thus it remains exceedingly 
important to leaders (fr. 55.6).81 Yet Dio also suggests that very few men 
can be good kings, since most cannot muster the condign judiciousness 
(fr. 12.9). This conclusion sits well with the cynicism we have detected in 
Dio’s political thought. 
(I 3) How are political risks calculated, controlled, and accepted?82
The Maecenas Speech. Throughout the course of his speech, the “political 
risk” about which Dio’s Maecenas demonstrates the most concern is the 
possibility of a coup against the emperor. The oration addresses this topic 
in numerous places, seemingly to the exclusion of other potential uncer-
tainties. Eliminating conspiracies and rebellions remains such a strong 
preoccupation on the part of Maecenas that it may tacitly demonstrate 
the power of Agrippa’s speech in favor of democracy.
Maecenas’ advice for curbing potential rebellions takes many forms. 
The speech stresses, for example, the importance of co-opting elites into 
the government; this will limit the number of potential figureheads for 
conspiracies (19.3). Maecenas also discusses the proper allotment of tasks 
to underlings: the granting of privileges too quickly (20.1) or the failure 
to divide weighty military and administrative roles (22.4, 23.2, 24.1–2) will 
prove dangerous. To promote Octavian’s safety, the address recommends 
the professionalization of the army, since this will ensure that only some 
of his subjects are armed (27.3).
The oration also highlights the value of prestige to the limiting of 
coups. Maecenas advises Octavian not to grant the traditional powers 
to magistrates but rather to preserve their dignity alone, while lessen-
ing their influence. This will confer status upon the office holders and 
simultaneously discourage rebellions (20.3). For the same reason, the 
oration suggests that Octavian pay salaries to a variety of administrators 
(21.7, 23.1, 25.1–2). Maecenas does not view such earnings as a means 
to encourage good work, but rather as a way of flattering the recipients. 
In contrast, Maecenas stresses that a ruler, unlike his subordinates, must 
not countenance honors for himself, since all he needs is power (35).
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Maecenas’ advice about maintaining the false appearance of 
democracy seems similarly Machiavellian. Although an opponent of 
popular participation in governance (cf. 30.2), he sees value in offering 
the trappings of republicanism. The speech recommends, for instance, 
that foreign embassies visit the Senate—not because the Senate has any 
real power over foreign affairs, but rather because the august body lends 
dignity to the proceedings (31.1). Although Maecenas aims to offer the 
Senate a judicial and legislative role of some sort,83 the oration makes 
clear that senatorial legislation requires approval from the emperor (cf. 
32.1, 33.3); the emperor, for example, has the right to appeal all senatorial 
judgments (33.1). According to Maecenas, then, a ruler lessens political 
risks by humoring elites into believing that they possess more power and 
freedom than is in fact the case.
Dio’s History. Dio offers similar sentiments in other places in his history. 
For example, he praises the Roman king Tarquinius Priscus for ascribing 
all political successes to others, rather than taking credit himself (fr. 9.2). 
When assessing Lucullus’ shortcomings as a general, Dio relates that he 
failed to understand the importance of conferring honors and money 
on underlings (36.16.2). He also makes clear that a leader should avoid 
personal blandishments. Thus he stresses the dangerousness of Caesar’s 
acceptance of numerous honors during his dictatorship (44.7.4). He 
likewise deems Domitian’s desire to be flattered τοῦτο δεινότατον (“this 
most awful characteristic,” 67[67].4.2), and he criticizes Didius Julianus 
for having bronze statues of him built (74[73].14.2a). In all, Dio’s history 
echoes the concerns about flattery that his Maecenas voices. 
(I 4) What is the best “timing” to advance one’s interests?84
The Maecenas Speech. Unfortunately, the Maecenas oration does not 
much discuss matters of timing, and this renders I 4 the only instrumen-
tal question from George’s arsenal for which the speech does not offer 
substantive answers. To the limited extent that the speech addresses this 
topic, it chiefly focuses on one issue—the proper cursus honorum for 
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aspiring magistrates.85 Dio’s Maecenas also mentions the importance of 
quick resolutions to disputes between private citizens (37.9–10), presum-
ably because this will lead to less civil strife, and thus less danger for the 
monarch. This sentiment, however, does not tell us much. Overall, the 
speech concentrates little attention on the proper timing of the emperor’s 
decisions, in part because the oration only sparingly addresses the topic 
of foreign policy.
Dio’s History. Dio’s brief conclusion to the Agrippa-Maecenas debate, 
however, presents us with far more information on this score. Although 
convinced by Maecenas’ words, Dio informs us, Octavian chose not to 
put all his suggestions into effect immediately, since he feared that such 
a drastic and sudden alteration could meet with failure; instead, Octavian 
gradually enacted some of Maecenas’ proposed reforms, leaving still  others 
to his successors (52.41.1–2). This support for modest and incremental 
modifications appears to fit with Dio’s aversion to revolutionary change 
(cf. fr. 12.3a). When men involve themselves in too many undertakings, 
Dio elsewhere notes, they inevitably become overwhelmed (fr. 21.1). But 
Dio also believes that leaders should not wait too long to enact their 
plans.86 Instead, he supports incremental action.
(I 5) What is the utility and role of different means for advancing  
one’s interests?
The Maecenas Speech. It is striking how much the “interests” Dio’s 
Maecenas addresses throughout the speech revolve around the emperor’s 
safety. Almost every concern the speech enumerates appears at least partly 
related to the personal security of the emperor. Even the splitting up of 
Italy into smaller administrative units, which Maecenas justifies on grounds 
of effectiveness (22.6), can be viewed as a means of dividing governmental 
tasks amongst subordinates so as not to threaten the ruler. Maecenas also 
cautions against entrusting too many troops to an individual underling’s 
command (22.4). He recommends that pro-magistrates not receive long 
terms of service, since this can lead to rebellions (23.2–3). Throughout the 
address, Maecenas perceives the importance of spreading power among a 
large group of office holders and of maintaining a strict cursus honorum, 
which will require these subordinates to prove themselves before they 
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are entrusted with further powers. One means of guaranteeing a leader’s 
interests, it seems, is to test underlings with increasingly large tasks and 
never to grant them commands that are dangerously powerful.
This is not the only means to protect the emperor mentioned in 
the oration. According to Maecenas, the ruler must also spend money 
wisely. Although an emperor ought to live frugally (29.3) and should not 
disperse funds lavishly throughout the Empire (30.3, 7), Maecenas sug-
gests the necessity of large expenditures for the city of Rome, since this 
will instill respect in the state’s allies and fear in her enemies (30.1). Thus 
the proper use of funds plays a role in advancing Octavian’s interests. 
The same holds true, argues Maecenas, for disenfranchising the masses. 
Although the speech offers at least a minor decision-making role to 
senators and equestrians, it counsels against the use of popular votes for 
any purpose (cf. 20.3, 30.2). The emperor can co-opt the elite to follow 
his wishes (cf. 19.3); popular participation in government will lead to 
civil strife. Maecenas also sees the need for the emperor to take more 
extreme measures to ensure his safety: the address supports, for example, 
the removal of sorcerers and other subversives from the state (36.3–4).87
Such Machiavellian tactics may not sit well with another means 
Maecenas recommends for Octavian to advance his interests. The ruler, 
he suggests, should both act and think in the manner he would desire of 
his subjects (34.1). To Maecenas, Octavian’s upstanding conduct would 
serve as a way to maintain control over the government. Readers may 
perceive that this unabashed moralizing amounts to an incongruous 
sentiment in an oration that elsewhere exhorts Octavian to lie about his 
status as a king (40) and to mislead subjects into disbelieving that they 
are slaves (19.4–5). Yet the speech’s overall message is a moral one: act 
like a beneficent monarch and Octavian will safely bask in his citizenry’s 
love (39.2–5).
Dio’s History. One detects echoes of some of these points in disparate 
places in Dio’s history. As we have demonstrated above, Dio displays 
keen interest in the role of the Senate in state affairs. Thus, for instance, 
he praises Hadrian for conducting crucial public business with the aid 
of the Senate and the state’s foremost men (69[69].7.1). This concern for 
the maintenance of senatorial perquisites coincides with an aversion to 
popular participation in governance. Dio, for example, condemns Pertinax 
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88 Cf. 56.40.4, where Dio’s Tiberius supports Augustus’ transferal of the people’s 
power to the courts.
89 Cf. 49.13.4, where Dio relates that Octavian realized a general should not give 
in to pressure from his soldiers and act contrary to his judgment. Such men, it seems, do 
not make for appropriate advisors. See also 78(77).13.6, which mentions that the detested 
Caracalla always regarded the soldiers as superior to senators. At 79(78).13.1, Dio criticizes 
the appointment of soldiers to consular status.
90 E.g., 49.43.5; 57.15.8–9; 65(66).13.1; 67(67).13.1–3.
91 For discussions of Thucydides’ influence on Dio, see, e.g., Manuwald 1979, 282–84; 
Ameling 1984, 130–31; Aalders 1986, 293–94; Rich 1989, 88; Freyburger-Galland 1997, 18–19. 
On Dio’s stylistic borrowings from Thucydides in the debate, see Kyhnitzsch 1894, 31–45.
92 For references to recent scholarly discussion of Thucydides’ perception of human 
nature, see above, n. 37.
for failing to stymie Roman mobs in the aftermath of Commodus’ assas-
sination (74[73].2).88 Overall, he shows deep regard for emperors sharing 
tasks with subordinates and demonstrates similar concern for the pedigree 
of those deemed fit to serve as their assistants.89 Dio also focuses atten-
tion on the removal of astrologers, philosophers, and kindred men from 
the city of Rome;90 it seems reasonable to connect this concern with the 
pronouncement Maecenas makes in this regard (36.3–4).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Having posed responses to George’s queries, we can now suggest a few 
conclusions. The preceding examination allows us to weigh in on the 
widespread scholarly disagreement about the relationship between the 
Agrippa and Maecenas addresses. As mentioned above, most classicists 
have contended that Dio intended the Agrippa speech to serve as an 
intentionally weak springboard for Maecenas’ response; some recent 
scholarship, however, asserts that both orations include elements of Dio’s 
political sentiments. Our analysis demonstrates that the Agrippa address 
contains assessments compatible with premises Dio supports elsewhere in 
his history. The speech maintains, for instance, a pessimistic, Thucydidean 
outlook on human nature;91 if anything, it, like the  Maecenas oration, 
appears even gloomier about human motivations than was the great 
Athenian historian.92 More fundamentally, we can say that the oration Dio 
attributed to Agrippa is based on the same philosophical foundations as 
the Maecenas speech. The two addresses’ answers to P 1–P 5 are virtually 
identical. Both consider the political universe inherently conflict-ridden; 
both prove largely pessimistic about the realization of fundamental politi-












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































93 See above, n. 25. This also suggests that Alonso-Núñez 1984 unfairly dismissed 
Espinosa Ruiz 1982.
94 Cf. Ag. 3.1, where Tacitus discusses the erstwhile incompatibility of the principate 
and libertas, until the reign of Nerva, who mixed the two.
because it alone would purportedly allow Octavian to gain great control 
over historical development.
To some extent, the correspondence in epistemological foundations 
between the orations results from the dialogue’s agonistic character: one 
speaker makes a charge, and his interlocutor naturally responds in kind. 
Yet such a dialogue does not require that both advisors possess identical 
philosophical worldviews. In a more realistic debate, an advisor might 
maintain that, say, a leader’s freedom of action is a crucial means to test 
the value of a given political system, and the other might fundamentally 
disagree. But this is not what Dio offers in the Agrippa-Maecenas dialogue. 
Rather, the two speakers demonstrate that virtually identical philosophi-
cal underpinnings inform their views on governance—regardless of the 
conclusions they draw.
This does not imply that both speeches completely reflect Dio’s 
normative political views. But it does suggest an effort on Dio’s part to 
present sound arguments on both sides of the debate, based on epistemo-
logical premises the historian deemed solid. Such a conclusion supports the 
outlook of Espinosa Ruiz and others who perceived that Dio’s political 
messages must be discovered from a combination of the two speeches.93
If Dio had aimed to craft a weak Agrippa address, he likely would have 
grounded it in philosophical assessments the historian considered wrong-
headed, such as a more optimistic view of human nature that allows for 
effective self-governance. Instead, as we have seen, he chose to present 
a brief in favor of democracy compatible with epistemological views one 
finds throughout Dio’s history. Scholars assessing the dialogue should not 
discount the sentiments found in the Agrippa speech, even though it favors 
a course of action untenable in the historian’s own day. Perhaps Dio’s 
outlook on the Roman Empire was similar to a view Tacitus offers in 
the Agricola (2.3): the best government lies in between the two extremes 
of license and slavery.94 In his postmortem estimation of Rome’s first 
emperor, after all, Dio himself contends that the Romans loved Augustus 
in part because his rule combined monarchy and democracy (56.43.4).
Such a conclusion seems compatible with another idea key to Dio’s 
conception of politics: the importance of moderation. The concern Dio 
demonstrates for self-restraint—especially in the earlier books of his his-
tory—may be of a piece with his regard for governmental moderation. In 
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95 Cf. 50.1.2, where Dio remarks that Antony’s and Octavian’s jockeying for power 
reduced the Romans to slavery.
96 Kuhlmann 2010, 110. See also Aalders 1986, 296–97.
97 E.g., 36.32.1; 45.44.2; 47.39; 50.1.1; 53.1.3; 53.11.2, 17.3, 11; 55.21.4. Cf. 43.45.1; 47.42.3.
98 E.g., 56.41.3, 43.4; 57.15.8–9; 59.3.1. See also 56.40.3; 57.7.2–6; 59.20.4. At 56.33.4, 
Dio discusses Augustus’ recommendations for his successors, which argue against the 
emperor’s autocratic control of public business, since this would be the mark of a tyranny. 
99 On this topic, see above, n. 37.
both cases, Dio—a staunch opponent of revolutionary change—prefers 
a state that is neither too democratic, nor too autocratic. Hence, for 
example, Dio praises the purportedly “democratic” aspects of Caligula’s 
(59.3.1) and Pertinax’s (74[73].3.4) reigns.95 
This hints at Dio’s shifting conception of democracy throughout his 
history. As Kuhlmann has noted, Dio’s Agrippa speech at least largely 
defends Greek-style democracy, rather than the government of the Roman 
Republic.96 We need not follow Kuhlmann, however, in presuming that 
this was the result of Herodotean influence on the Agrippa-Maecenas 
debate. In fact, Dio regularly—and misleadingly—labels the Roman 
Republic a “democracy” throughout his history.97 He may have employed 
this description as a sort of shorthand. Dio often identifies a monarchi-
cal government as “democratic” if its leader allows for some degree of 
senatorial input on affairs.98 As a proponent of a “mixed” constitution, he 
may have aimed to use the Agrippa-Maecenas debate in part to present 
philosophical defenses of both democracy and monarchy. Although the 
Maecenas speech proffers a more realistic response to the vicissitudes of 
the high Empire, Dio may have deemed it valuable to remind his read-
ers—who lived under increasingly autocratic emperors—of some benefits 
associated with democratic governance.
More generally, our examination has demonstrated how thoroughly 
Dionian both speeches are. They appear consistent with aspects of the 
historian’s own intellectual predilections. Even the instrumental portion 
of the Maecenas address remains compatible with Dio’s penchant for pes-
simism and is peppered with the moralistic apothegms one typically finds 
in his other speeches. One also detects in the debate a tension between 
these twin aspects of this thought.99 
This tension between Dio’s cynical outlook on human nature and a 
preference for moralistic solutions to political problems seems most pal-
pable in regard to the figure of the emperor. Although both the Agrippa 
and Maecenas addresses highlight the congenital malignity of human 
beings, Maecenas’ advice to Octavian hinges on the emperor himself 
avoiding the moral pitfalls Dio elsewhere associates with humanity as 
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100This view may have a Thucydidean precedent. See, e.g., Lebow 2003, 70: “He 
[Thucydides] repeatedly contrasts the demos, the majority of citizens who pursue primar-
ily selfish ends, with the dunatoi, influential political men more likely to govern in the 
interests of the polis.”
101 On Thucydides as the forefather of the realist and neo-realist schools of interna-
tional relations, see, e.g., Johnson Bagby 1994; Kokaz 2001.
102 Swan 2004, 12.
103 Ibid. 11.
104 E.g., 67(67).12.1. See the section discussing P 5 above.
a whole. Thus, according to the Maecenas oration, men innately crave 
prestige, but the emperor must resist this temptation (35). Others remain 
naturally inclined to misbehave, but the emperor must always conduct 
himself in an upright manner (34.1). Dio’s deep regard for a hierarchical 
society leads him implicitly to contend that human nature only affects 
the great unwashed: elite senators do not suffer from the vices inherent 
among the populace.100 But perhaps Dio only fully disregards the sup-
posedly base realities of human nature for the emperor himself. Even 
senators and equestrians require flattery and the false appearance of 
power to remain loyal to the government.
In many ways, the philosophical portions of both speeches demon-
strate the ways in which Dio’s Thucydidean realism trumps his occasional 
inclination to offer moralistic sentiments.101 The two addresses portray 
the political universe as rife with conflict and see enemies lurking every-
where. Both orations—when taken together—also underscore the dim 
prospects a leader faces when attempting to realize his political goals. This 
may serve to make readers conclude that the speeches’ morally tinged 
arguments appear unrealistic and naïve. And this gives us more reason 
to suspect that Dio aimed for his audience to take both the Agrippa and 
Maecenas addresses seriously. After all, the combination of the Agrippa 
and Maecenas speeches reinforces a sense of gloom detectable in Dio’s 
history as a whole. 
All this underscores the pessimistic character of much of Dio’s 
political thought. Although Swan suggests that “Human nature is the most 
important single source of evil in Dio’s generally friendly universe,”102 the 
preceding pages have demonstrated that this is too rosy an estimation. 
According to Swan, as Dio sees matters, “It was open to human agents 
to second heaven’s purpose or to resist it.”103 But Dio makes clear that 
people—through no fault of their own—could not always divine heaven’s 
purpose;104 further, the historian’s conception of the gods’ role in terrestrial 
affairs seems inconsistent. At times Dio portrays fortune as capricious 
and notes that heaven does not always—or even often—favor the just. 
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105 E.g., 69(69).5.1; 72(71).22.1, 24.1; 74(73).17.6; 75(75).3.2–3. Cf. 78(77).3.2, where 
Dio ridicules Caracalla due to the emperor’s affection for Alexander the Great. See also 
Dio’s Boudica speech (62[62].3–6), which focuses on the injustices associated with Roman 
Cynical appraisals of human nature and public life dominate Dio’s politi-
cal discussions and asides. In comparison with them, Dio’s contentions 
about the role of fortune and divine will seem erratic and uneven. His 
does not appear to be an especially “friendly universe.” 
Dio’s conception of human nature also speaks to other similarities 
between his Agrippa and Maecenas orations. We have noted that Dio’s 
speakers both largely contend that the political future is predictable. To 
some extent, this must relate to the character of the debate itself. It obvi-
ously remains difficult to counsel a particular course of action if one has 
no sense of what its repercussions may be. But the dialogue’s stressing 
of the predictability of later events also seems to accord with Dio’s own 
perception of human nature, which maintains that human motivations 
are fixed. This disparaging view of his fellow men may have compelled 
Dio to stress the inevitability of future events.
Another prominent element in the Maecenas oration could reinforce 
a sense of pessimism in the debate. The answers of the Maecenas speech 
to I 3 and I 5 together demonstrate that it is preoccupied with the ruler’s 
safety, to the point of minimizing other potential political risks. This could 
(unwittingly?) reinforce the contentions of Dio’s Agrippa about the dan-
gers of monarchy and gainsay some of the strength of Maecenas’ plea. 
Despite Maecenas’ best efforts, it may appear more difficult to establish 
a stable monarchy than his address contends. Given Dio’s aversion to 
radical change, we should not be surprised if the historian underscores this 
impression in his dialogue. It seems striking, moreover, that in a debate 
over a preferable system of governance, Dio focuses so little attention 
on the proper ends and goals of government in general.
Interestingly, the Maecenas oration does not see imperialism and 
colonialism as appropriate political goals, instead viewing them as the 
unfortunate result of the factionalism and civil strife inherent to democra-
cies (15.4). We have reason to believe Dio did not completely agree with 
this contention: at other points in his work, the historian attributes Roman 
conquest during the Imperial period to emperors’ desire for renown 
(68[68].17.1; 75[75].1.1). Thus Dio did not see democratic in-fighting 
as completely responsible for Roman expansionism. Yet the Maecenas 
oration’s broader impression of imperialism appears to sit well with its 
author’s views on the topic. The historian, in fact, has sprinkled his his-
tory with a surprising number of anti-imperialist sentiments.105 According 
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colonialism. On this speech, and, more generally, Dio’s views of imperialism, see Adler 
2011b, 141–61.
106 Swan 2004, 12.
107 See, for example, 78(77).3.2, 8.1–2, 13.6, 17.1–2; 79(78).13.1; 80(79).3.5–4.2.
108Through OCA, we could more systematically assess, for example, whether Dio’s 
political views “display a remarkable conformity with those of other Greek authors of 
imperial times,” as Aalders 1986, 302, suggests. Cf. Gabba 1955, 320, who links Dio’s support 
for monarchy to the zeitgeist of Rome in the second century c.E.
109 I would like to thank David H. J. Larmour and AJP’s anonymous referees for their 
helpful criticisms and suggestions. Special thanks are due to Calvert Jones, who introduced 
me to OCA, and to Stephen Walker, who offered much guidance about its proper use. I 
dedicate this article to the memory of my dear mentor and colleague, Dirk Held. 
to Swan, Dio opposed military adventurism because he believed that 
chance played a significant part in its outcome.106 But we have seen that 
Dio stresses fortune’s role in numerous matters, and this, on its own, 
does not imply that they are unworthy goals. Further, the historian was 
certainly no pacifist (cf. fr. 8.1). It seems more likely that Dio’s criticism 
of imperialism stems from his aversion to military men rising to posi-
tions of political prominence.107 Our examination has demonstrated that 
Dio jealously guarded senatorial prerogatives. Since military adventur-
ism increased the importance of the Roman army at the expense of the 
Senate, this was sufficient grounds for his opposition to it.
Further conclusions about Dio’s political proclivities would come 
to light from analyses of other ancient authors’ operational codes. Are 
the philosophical and instrumental beliefs detectable in the Agrippa-
Maecenas debate typical of figures from the mid-Imperial period? Are 
they similar to those of other writers from the Empire’s Greek elite? 
Future forays into OCA should offer insights into these and kindred top-
ics. Cicero’s letters, Dio Chrysostom’s political orations, and the pseudo-
Sallustian Epistulae ad Caesarem senem come to mind as useful conduits 
for this approach, though undoubtedly other classical works would prove 
similarly productive.108 Studies of such writers would allow scholars to 
offer comparative assessments of ancient perceptions of grand strategy 
and could possibly underscore the unique assessments of domestic and 
foreign policy of various ancient authors. Comparative analysis of dispa-
rate leaders’ operational codes has proved fruitful for political scientists; 
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